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Organizational knowledgeable responses to institutional pressures – A 
review, synthesis and extension 
 
Abstract  
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to critically review and explore how organizations 
knowledgeably respond to unfavorable institutional environments that exert institutional 
pressures and thereby limit their decision-making and eventually their actual behavior. 
Design/methodology/approach: Based on a thorough structuration and analysis of the 
literature in management and related fields, we present a comprehensive synthesis of 
organizational knowledgeable responses to institutional pressures. 
Findings: Based on the review, we categorize organizational knowledgeable responses 
into three major types – passively responding to avoid non-conformity, reactively 
mitigating institutional pressures and proactively developing institutional environments 
towards less interfering setups. 
Research implications/limitations: We discuss the enabling conditions for the 
categorized organizational knowledgeable responses as well as limitations to their 
application. We identify research gaps and formulate research questions to offer promising 
avenues for future work. We expect this detailed synthesis to lay the framework for 
investigating how the knowledge-based view of the organization influences its 
knowledgeable response to institutional pressure. 
Practical implications: We elaborate on distinct passive, reactive and proactive strategies, 
which firms can apply in order to cope with institutional pressures. Our contribution will 
be of relevance to practitioners managing organizations in the face of unfavorable 
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institutional setups, as well as to policy makers engaged in the development of institutions 
and interacting with affected organizations. 
Originality: Our study provides a valuable overview on developments in institutional 
theory, particularly on contributions to the ‘nascent literature’ that examines heterogeneous 
organizational knowledgeable responses to institutional pressures. 
 
Keywords: Institutional theory, Institutional pressures, Organization knowledgeable 





Organizational knowledgeable responses to institutional pressures – A 
review, synthesis and extension 
 
Introduction 
Organizations of all kind, size and origin are substantially impacted by a broad set of 
institutions. Institutional environments are conceived as the entirety of institutions that 
surround an organization and affect it in an interrelated manner (Batjargal et al., 2013). An 
organization’s institutional environment may comprise a multidimensional and 
interdependent portfolio of overlapping “organizational fields” of different kinds (e.g. 
political, social, etc.), levels (e.g. local, national, international, etc.) and domains (e.g. 
industry, product, etc.) (Holmes et al., 2013).  
Organizations face institutional environments that exert pressure on organizations, 
widely known as institutional pressures. We define institutional pressures as unfavorable 
influences on organizations that are exerted by institutions and limit the choice of 
organizations concerning their structures and conduct. Examples for institutional pressures 
faced by organizations include environmental protection regulations and financial reforms 
issued by federal or state authorities (coercive/regulatory institutional pressure), and 
modern digital payment technology standards being demanded by customers and other 
business partners (normative institutional pressure).  
Firms, on the one hand, rely on the presence and functioning of institutions for 
concerns as diverse and important as information gathering, market regulation, and contract 
enforcement (Khanna et al., 2010). On the other hand, social, economic, and political 
institutions exert substantial constraints on the behavior of organizations and 
entrepreneurial activities (Clemens & Douglas, 2005; Peng et al., 2009; Ioannou & 
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Serafeim, 2012; Kim et al., 2013; Sun et al., 2014; Dieleman & Widjaja, 2018; Opper et 
al., 2018). Therefore, it is clear that institutional environments lend support and legitimacy 
to organizations but also issue rules and requirements that organizations have to conform 
to (Scott, 1987; Rothenberg, 2007; Tan et al., 2007; Pache & Santos, 2010; Gao, 2011; 
Pache & Santos, 2013).  
 The overarching objective of this study is to understand the opportunities 
organizations have at hand to beneficially position themselves in the face of institutional 
pressures and strategically cope with them. We attempt to achieve this objective by 
systematically analyzing institutional theory and the development of its major concepts in 
the recent academic literature to answer the following two research questions (RQ): 
RQ1 - How do organizations deal with different institutional pressures?  
RQ2 - How have the knowledgeable responses of organizations to these 
institutional pressures changed over time? 
Extending the knowledge management definition by Grant (2016, p. 1), we define 
organizational knowledgeable responses as the responses of organizations built on 
identification, creation, storage, diffusion, replication and application of different 
knowledge assets (Shubham et al., 2018). As all organizations are engaged in managing 
knowledge within them (Grant, 2016), through this research we capture the knowledgeable 
responses such as distinct passive, reactive and proactive ones that organizations have 
made in order to cope with institutional pressures. Following it, we present the recent 
developments of such strategies including enabling conditions, limitations to their 
application and critique offered by academics. We expect this detailed synthesis to lay the 
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framework for future researchers interested in investigating how the knowledge-based 
view of the organization influences its knowledgeable response to institutional pressure. 
 
Research Background 
Although the first significant contributions to institutional theory date back as far as to 
Selznick (1948), there is still massive interest and potential for further research in 
institutional theory in a variety of fields (e.g. Clemens & Douglas, 2005; Henisz & 
Swaminathan, 2008; Suddaby et al., 2010; Kauppi, 2013; Eesley, 2016; Granqvist & 
Gustafsson, 2016; Battard et al., 2017; Li, 2017; Micelotta et al., 2017). Some recent 
contributions to institutional theory show an impressive ‘degree of diversity, in levels of 
analyses, empirical contexts, and methodological approaches’ (Suddaby et al., 2010: p. 
1235). We focus on management literature but accounts for relevant contributions from the 
fields of economics, entrepreneurship, sociology, and politics as scholars from these fields 
have also made major contributions to the institutional literature relevant for our research 
focus.  
Our paper is in direct alignment with the future research directions listed by López-
Duarte et al. (2018), where they emphasized the importance of conceptual work and called 
researchers to pursue theoretical conceptualization by reflecting on the published literature. 
We cater to this “longstanding pending assignment” (Pleggenkuhle-Miles et al., 2007; 
López-Duarte et al., 2018) of increasing the volume of conceptual works by looking back 




Figure 1 represents the research focus and key concepts of this paper. We discuss 
organizational knowledgeable responses to institutional pressures in the order of increased 
level of agency. We thereby account for the time of introduction of these responses and 
their representation during the development of institutional theory from 1977. Following 
the introduction of key concepts like organizational multiplicity and embedded agency, 
researched organizational knowledgeable responses to institutional pressures increased in 
their level of agency over time.  While passive responses may still be appropriate today, 
proactive responses did not enjoy a considerable representation on new institutionalists’ 
agenda in the 1970s and 1980s. Since Oliver’s (1991) seminal article on organizational 
responses to institutional pressures, literature has further developed several institutional 
constructs and organizational knowledgeable responses. 
By answering the stated research questions, we hope to provide a valuable overview 
on recent developments in institutional theory, particularly on recent contributions to the 
‘nascent literature’ (Doshi et al., 2013: p. 1211) that examines heterogeneous responses to 
institutional pressures. Structured analysis revealed promising future avenues to further 
progress the realm of institutional environments and organizational knowledgeable 
responses. Our contribution is expected to be of relevance to practitioners managing 
organizations in the face of unfavorable institutional setups, as well as to policy makers 
engaged in the development of institutions and interacting with affected organizations. 
 
===================== 






In this paper, we follow North’s (1990: p. 3) definition of institutions stated as ‘the rules 
of the game’ in a society or economy. Institutions are seen as prescriptions of appropriate 
conduct (Greenwood et al., 2013) that may be of cognitive, normative, or regulative nature 
(Scott, 1995). In order to not exclude any relevant contribution in the literature, we apply 
a rather broad definition of institutions that accounts for an organization’s entire 
institutional environment including political institutions such as regulations, economic 
institutions such as market structures, and socio-cultural institutions such as informal 
norms (Henisz & Delios, 2002), as well as their respective enforcement mechanisms 
(Ingram & Clay, 2000).  
Aligning with DiMaggio and Powell (1991), we distinguish between old 
institutionalism that focused on power and date back to Selznick (1948), the legitimacy-
focused new institutionalism that was initialized by Meyer and Rowan (1977), and the neo-
institutionalism that tries to integrate and bridge the gaps between the two old schools (e.g. 
Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). We follow Collins’ (2013: p. 527) definition of 
organizations stated as ‘groups of all types, whether they are social groups, coalitions, or 
corporations, structured to pursue some collective purpose’. Although this paper focuses 
on corporations, the broad definition eases integrating studies from other fields. 
 Our analysis of the institutional literature focusing on potential organizational 
knowledgeable responses to institutional pressures was piloted with articles from reputed 
journals in the fields of general management, strategy, organizations, and international 
business. Specifically, we focused on articles published in Academy of Management 
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Journal (AMJ), Academy of Management Review (AMR), Administrative Science 
Quarterly (ASQ), Journal of Management (JoM), Strategic Management Journal (SMJ), 
Organization Science (Org Sci), Organization Studies (Org Stu), and Journal of 
International Business Studies (JIBS). This pilot review helped in defining the keywords 
for the actual review. Following the pilot study, we used EBSCO host services and 
searched for several keywords and combinations including, among others, institutional 
environment, institutional pressure, embedded agency, entrepreneurship, and 
organizational field.  
We preselected articles by their title and abstract. Particularly, abstracts were 
studied to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the paper’s content contained aspects 
relevant to our chosen research question, i.e. organizational knowledgeable responses to 
unfavorable institutional environment including enabling conditions, limitations to their 
application, critical assessments, and case studies. Each of the authors checked the 
selection of the other. Only in 4 per cent of the papers selected, the authors disagreed on 
the selection. In case of doubt, the paper was kept among the selected papers. In addition, 
we screened reference lists of the selected papers to identify the left out relevant papers 
from other fields such as economics, entrepreneurship, sociology, and politics. We also 
supplemented these selected papers with several impactful books and book chapters that 
are widely cited within the institutional literature. More than 150 papers on the key 
concepts of institutional theory and the response opportunities of organizations were 
identified and analyzed. Throughout the process, we reviewed each piece of literature in 
detail in order to determine its contribution to the specific research questions raised in this 
paper. The close evaluation of organization’s knowledgeable response to institutional 
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pressure clustered the literature into three broad themes - passively responding within one 
organizational field, reactively responding to institutional multiplicity, and proactive 
developing institutional environments through embedded agents. We discuss in detail the 
strategies adopted by organizations under each of these individual themes below.  
 
Review - Institutional pressures and corresponding knowledgeable 
responses 
Passively responding within one organizational field 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) introduced the notion of the ‘organizational field’, which 
later constituted to be a central concept of institutional theory (Wooten & Hoffman, 2013) 
and the ‘primary arena’ (Heugens & Lander, 2009: p. 62) used to conceptually and 
empirically research organizational knowledgeable responses to institutional pressures 
(Oliver, 1991). Originally defined as ‘sets of organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute 
an area of institutional life; key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory 
agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products’ (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983: p. 148f), organizational fields are the major level at which institutional 
impacts shape organizational behavior (Pache & Santos, 2010). Scott (1995) further added 
that organizations within an organizational field interact more directly and repeatedly with 
each other than with actors outside the field and share collective beliefs and meaning 
systems. New institutionalists frequently conceptualized organizational fields as being 
single and unitary (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Accordingly, each 
organization within an organizational field is influenced by the same institutional 
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pressures. Figure 2 illustrates the different concepts and types of organizational 
knowledgeable responses in a simplified manner. 
==================== 
Insert Figure 2 around here 
===================== 
Acquiescence 
Following Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) seminal article, institutional theory basically 
promoted a single organizational knowledgeable response to institutional pressures within 
an organizational field called acquiescence (Oliver, 1991), which means non-reflective 
conformity (Lawrence, 1999). Driven by skepticism towards atomistic accounts of social 
processes as advocated by, for example, neoclassical economists, new institutionalists 
emphasized the strong and direct impact of institutional forces on the conduct of 
organizations (Heugens & Lander, 2009; Wooten & Hoffman, 2013). Rejecting rational 
choice as an ‘undersocialized’ (Granovetter, 1985: p. 481) conception that undermines 
environmental impacts, new institutionalists shared the conviction that the source driving 
organizational action originates from outside the focal actor (Wooten & Hoffman, 2013). 
 According to new institutional logics, firms react on institutional pressures with 
submissive alignment (Kostova et al., 2008) by adapting their structure and conduct to a 
given institutional pressure (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2013). This indiscriminative 
conformity results in organizational isomorphism (Battilana et al., 2009; Greenwood et al., 
2013; Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2013; Lawrence, 1999; Hoffman & Ventresca, 2002) as the 
behavior of organizations sharing an institutional field must reasonably be expected to be 
shaped by the same structural forces (Heugens & Lander, 2009). This uniformity–created 
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over time as organizations collectively follow and incorporate institutionally prescribed 
templates (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983)–refers to organizational 
structure (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Bansal & Penner, 2002), conduct (Bansal & Penner, 
2002; Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2013), and output (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Boxenbaum 
& Jonsson, 2013), and, less visibly, extends to culture, beliefs and values (Bansal & Penner, 
2002; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
 Institutional literature proposes three major justifications for acquiescing. First, 
following rationalized myths about what constitutes proper behavior (Boxenbaum & 
Jonsson, 2013) that are accepted as externally given social facts (Wooten & Hoffman, 
2013). Second, gaining legitimacy in the eyes of relevant stakeholders (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Scott, 1987; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Lawrence, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002; 
Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Battilana et al., 2009; Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2013; Greenwood 
et al., 2013; Wooten & Hoffman, 2013). Third, copying standard approaches in situations 
of high uncertainty and ambiguity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Shipilov et al., 2010). As 
Table 1 shows, the three reasons for conformity can be linked to the types of institutions, 
types of isomorphism (Kostova & Roth, 2002) and acquiescence responses by Oliver 
(1991).  
===================== 
Insert Table 1 around here 
===================== 
Following rationalized myths led to frequent criticism claiming that acquiescence 
was the response of mindless actors (Schmidt, 2008; Wooten & Hoffman, 2013). On the 
other hand, gaining legitimacy and avoiding uncertainty are two undeniable benefits of 
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conformity and isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Hence, acquiescing 
organizations are not necessarily mindless but might decide consciously (Cantwell et al., 
2010; Regnér & Edman, 2014; Luo et al., 2002) in order to be rewarded for conformity 
(Scott, 1987). Correspondingly, a meta-analytical evidence contradicts the conformity-
performance tradeoff and shows a positive relationship between isomorphism and firm 
performance (Heugens & Lander, 2009). 
 Institutional theory has been substantially criticized for its contextual and 
argumentative orientation during the era of new institutionalism. Three main concerns were 
raised by critics. First, Meyer and Rowan (1977) and their early fellows had a strong bias 
towards explaining organizational homogeneity (isomorphism) rather than heterogeneity 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Organizational fields, institutional pressures and 
organizational knowledgeable responses were all conceived as static and unitary (Wooten 
& Hoffman, 2013). Second, new institutionalists have frequently deduced the operation of 
institutional processes from the mere presence of isomorphism (Adegbite & Nakajima, 
2012; Heugens & Lander, 2009). Organizations may decide for identical patterns not 
because they are forced, uncertain, or morally obliged to do so (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 
2013), but because it is the best available solution that weeds out less efficient ones (Scott, 
2008; Heugens & Lander, 2009). Third, the most fundamental criticism refers to new 
institutionalists’ neglect of agency (Lawrence, 1999; Heugens & Lander, 2009). Later, 
institutional theory scholars remarked that organizations have some discretion in 
responding to institutional pressures (Heugens & Lander, 2009), and that these pressures 
may even be a source of deviance (Oliver, 1991) or institutional entrepreneurship, 





Reactively responding to institutional multiplicity 
 Institutional theory’s early focus on explaining homogeneity started being severely 
challenged during the years following the new institutional era. Institutionalists 
increasingly questioned and re-examined their earlier assumptions (Scott, 1987) such as 
the concept of a single, unitary, and stable organizational field (Cantwell et al., 2010). 
Researchers developed a growing acceptance that organizations face not one but multiple 
institutional environments (Scott, 1987), and that both organizational fields and 
organizations are less homogeneous as initially envisaged (Greenwood et al., 2013). This 
work resulted in the establishment of the concept of institutional multiplicity as the 
existence of multiple institutions and institutional logics both within and across 
organizational fields.  
 Multiplicity exerts contradictory demands on organizations (Seo & Creed, 2002; 
Pache & Santos, 2010; Scott, 1987). Contradictions may arise between institutions of 
different types, levels, locations and temporal spheres (Purdy & Gray, 2009; Westphal & 
Zajac, 2001). The challenge for organizations arises from institutions being not only 
numerous, but also conflicting. Institutional literature stresses the complexity (Alon, 2013; 
Greenwood et al., 2010; Batjargal et al. 2013; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Chandler, 2014; 
Raaijmakers et al., 2015; Ramus et al., 2017) and interdependence (Ostrom, 2005; Ingram 
& Silverman, 2000) of institutions and their impact on organizations. 
 The concept of institutional multiplicity is at odds with new institutionalism’s 
standard response to institutional pressures. Unilateral conformity as introduced above is 
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not possible as satisfying one institutional demand would mean to ignore or defy another 
(Pache & Santos, 2010; Oliver, 1991), thereby endangering the organization’s overall 
legitimacy (Scott, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2010). Organizations’ identities are pulled apart 
and cross-institutional consistency and integrity are hardly achievable (Kraatz & Block, 
2013). On the contrary, being subject to multiple institutional pressures or logics may 
create opportunities (Regnér & Edman, 2014) as organizations use the existing 
contradictions as well as their exposure to other organizational fields and their experience 
with conflicting institutional setups (Garud et al., 2007). Inspired by multiplicity and driven 
by their interest to reduce uncertainty and resolve conflict (Oliver, 1991), organizations 
may engage in alternative practices and strategic and knowledgeable responses (Oliver, 
1991; Hardy & Maguire, 2013; Regnér & Edman, 2014). As firms are less homogeneous 
as assumed in new institutionalism, their knowledgeable responses to institutional 
pressures will also be less uniform (Doshi et al., 2013; Greenwood et al., 2013). 
Therefore, conventional new institutional assumptions and explanations are not 
sufficient (Kraatz & Block, 2013) as ‘institutional environments are multiple, enormously 
diverse, and variable over time’ (Scott, 1987: p. 508), and firms can respond to institutional 
multiplicity, both despite and because of it (Kraatz & Block, 2013). In the next sections, 
we elaborate on possible organizational knowledgeable responses to institutional pressures 
that are more active and creative than new institutional acquiescence. 
 
Reactive responses 
Starting in the 1990s, institutional theory experienced more and more criticism for 
portraying organizations too passively and environments as overly constraining 
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(Greenwood et al., 2013). The focus on passivity rather than activeness, conformity rather 
than resistance, and unconscious habit rather than rational decision making became less 
accepted (Oliver, 1991; Greenwood et al., 2013), and researchers called for the restoration 
of agency to institutionalism (Leca & Naccache, 2006). Institutional literature thus shifted 
to a greater emphasis on organizational self-interest, agency, and strategic knowledgeable 
responses to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991; Cantwell et al., 2010; Wooten & 
Hoffman, 2013; Schilke, 2017). This emancipation from determinism (Leca & Naccache, 
2006), along with the tensions stemming from institutional multiplicity (Pache & Santos, 
2010), allow for considering diverging organizational knowledgeable responses (Ingram 
& Clay, 2000) that reach from conformity to outright defiance (Oliver, 1991). 
 Organizations applying the responses introduced in this section still conceive of 
institutions as externally given and constraining. Yet, they do not operate towards changing 
institutions’ nature or influencing their development. The focus is rather on actively 
dodging or ignoring institutional pressures, and strategically alleviating the tensions 
stemming from institutional multiplicity (Pache & Santos, 2010). We explain the widely 
adopted four reactive responses, namely ceremonial adoption, avoidance, compromise, and 
ignorance, in Table 2.  
===================== 
Insert Table 2 around here 
===================== 
 
Proactive development of institutional environments by embedded agents 
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During the end of the 1990s, scholars increasingly lamented that organizations were still 
portrayed as being largely caught within institutional constraints and that institutional 
theory lacked the power to explain institutional change. Consequently, they called for 
bringing back the concept of change into the institutional literature and for paying more 
attention to organizations’ active influence on institutional development (Hirsch & 
Lounsbury, 1997; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996).  
 In the following years, research has been shedding more light on how institutions 
originate and evolve under the purposive influence of organizational actors (e.g. Hoffman 
& Ventresca, 2002; Seo & Creed, 2002; Kogut et al., 2002). Within this stream of literature, 
organizational agency does not merely refer to a degree of adaptation (Saka-Helmhout & 
Geppert, 2011). Organizational actors do not only work towards neutralizing or dodging 
institutional pressures, but to affect, change and shape the formation and transformation of 
institutions and their impacts on organizations (Lawrence, 1999; Dorado, 2005). This new 
level of agency that is intended to improve the rules has been termed institutional strategy–
as opposed to competitive strategy that is limited to improve within the rules (Lawrence, 
1999; Martin, 2014).  
 The central role assigned to organizational agency in the (trans)formation of 
institutions engendered a major debate in institutional literature at the center of which is 
the paradox of embedded agency – ‘one of the most important challenges facing 
contemporary institutional theory’ (Battilana et al., 2009: p. 96). The core question the 
debate circles around is how an organization (or individual) whose identity, cognition and 
conduct are conditioned by the prevalent institutions is able to break with and change these 
very same institutions (Holm, 1995; Battilana et al., 2009; Thornton & Ocasio, 2013). 
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Being subject to regulative, normative and cognitive institutions, how can actors disembed 
from these influences (Leca & Naccache, 2006) and envision and champion new structures 
and practices (Hardy & Maguire, 2013)? 
 The debate is enriched by structural determinism on the one side and rational choice 
on the other (Battilana et al., 2009). The former conceives of institutions as hegemonic 
(Greenwood et al., 2013) and organizations as unable to escape institutional embeddedness 
(Leca & Naccache, 2006; Pinkse & Kolk, 2012), the latter understands organizations as 
free to decide and act. This long-standing tension between structure and agency is a central 
theme in recent institutional thinking (Greenwood et al., 2013). 
In order to come to a solution to the paradox of embedded agency, literature on 
institutional entrepreneurship and co-evolution proposes to account for institutions as 
enabling and constraining but not determining the choices of actors (Battilana et al., 2009). 
Structure and agency should not be put in a subordinate relation to each other as this would 
either neglect the freedom of actors or the constraining power of institutions (Leca & 
Naccache, 2006). The co-evolutionary perspective, based on the notion of institutions 
being enacted instead of divined (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Lawrence, 1999), explicitly 
considers multi-directional interaction patterns (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; Lewin & 
Volberda, 1999) by ‘accounting for the influence of context on the entrepreneur and for the 
freedom of the latter to modify it’ (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008: p. 1274). Organizations and 
institutions are conceived as parts of a larger system where they interdependently influence 
each other’s evolution (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008) in a dynamic and complex manner 
(Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002; Sun et al., 2014). This perspective of mutual interaction 
allows for institutions being products of and constraints to action alike (Holm, 1995; 
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Beckert, 1999; Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002; Rodrigues & Child, 2003). This actually 
corroborates North’s (1990: p. 3, emphasis added) early definition of institutions as 
‘humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction’. 
 
Institutional entrepreneurship 
Institutional entrepreneurship, originally introduced into literature by DiMaggio 
(1988) has attracted a lot of attention in management research during the last years (e.g. 
Garud et al., 2007; Battilana et al., 2009; Pacheco et al., 2010; Tolbert et al., 2011; Canales, 
2016; Qureshi et al., 2016). It represents an intriguing field as institutionalism traditionally 
tends to focus on continuity while entrepreneurship has always been closely related to 
change (Garud et al., 2007; Henfridsson & Yoo, 2013). Compared to the other 
organizational approaches introduced above, institutional entrepreneurship is something 
inherently imaginative and proactive. It can be called the innovation & knowledgeable 
response to institutional pressures. Innovations as the result of institutional 
entrepreneurship may comprise new formal institutions (e.g. Demil & Bensédrine, 2005), 
deinstitutionalization (i.e. the dissolution of an existent institution) (Hardy & Maguire, 
2013), new organizational forms (e.g. Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006), new role identities 
(e.g. Rao et al., 2003), or new practices (e.g. Boxenbaum & Battilana, 2005). 
Institutional entrepreneurship is induced or facilitated by two enabling aspects - 
field-level conditions (Table 3) and the entrepreneur’s personal or organizational 
characteristics (Table 4). An institutional entrepreneur is defined as a ‘self-interested agent 
that sponsors institutional change to capture economic benefits’ (Pacheco et al., 2010: p. 
975), whereas the actors on the other hand merely react on given institutional pressures. 
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Institutional entrepreneurs may be individuals or groups of individuals (Maguire et al., 
2004; Kraatz & Moore, 2002), organizations or groups of organizations (Garud et al., 2002; 
Greenwood et al., 2002), and may either be central actors (e.g. Greenwood & Suddaby, 
2006; Rao et al., 2003; Boxenbaum & Battilana, 2005) or peripheral peers (Lounsbury et 
al., 2003; Hensmans, 2003). Literature suggests that institutional entrepreneurs achieve 
their intended objectives through four main approaches, namely spotting opportunities, 
mobilizing resources, collaborating, and discoursing, as detailed in Table 5. 
========================================== 
Insert Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5 around here 
========================================== 
Political strategies 
Institutional literature suggests that firms not only combat competitors in different 
market arenas but also in the nonmarket political realm to influence the institutional players 
who determine public policy (e.g. state and federal legislatures, regulatory agencies and 
courts) (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008; Peng et al., 2009; Dieleman & Widjaja, 2018). 
Organizational attempts to affect the policies and regulations that impact their conduct and 
performance potentials have long been and still are intensively researched, as exemplified 
by the literature on corporate political activities and nonmarket strategies (e.g. Holburn & 
Vanden Bergh, 2002). Political strategies are limited to regulative–as opposed to normative 
and cognitive–institutions (Keefer & Knack, 2005). Hillman and Hitt (1999) distinguish 
organizations’ political approaches into informational strategies, financial incentive 
strategies and constituency building strategies which correspond to the three goods in 
political markets–information, money, and votes, respectively (Hillman at al., 2004).  
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 As political entities assume substantial influence on the institutional arrangements 
governing organizations (Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2002; Cui & Jiang, 2012), political 
strategies have the potential to considerably enhance organizational performance (Shaffer, 
1995). While political strategies often lead to one-time transactional advantages (Hillman 
et al., 2004) like preferential access to licenses or government contracts (Dieleman & 
Sachs, 2008; Puffer et al., 2010), institutional theory predominantly emphasizes the value 
of organizations’ long-term relational advantages (Hillman et al., 2004) allowing them to 
shape regulatory boundaries (Rodrigues & Child, 2003) and the institutional environment 
at large (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2002). 
Political strategies may promise more benefits when applied in deficient resource 
environments as political advantage through nonmarket strategies might be easier 
obtainable and more performance-relevant than market strategies (Wan, 2005; Brockman 
et al., 2013). However, organizations should be aware that political strategies have some 
substantial limitations. First, they might backfire in case political power switches, e.g. 
through elections (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009; Dieleman & Sachs, 2008); second, political 
engagement may be perceived as illegitimate, particularly when it includes corruption 
(Dieleman & Sachs, 2008); third, non-market strategies and capabilities are extraordinarily 
local in nature and can hardly be transferred to other realms (Wan, 2005). 
 
Cognitive and discursive strategies 
Cognition and discourse refer to actors’ ‘background ideational abilities’ and 
‘foreground discursive abilities’ (Schmidt, 2008: p. 315). Of particular interest for 
proactive organizational knowledgeable responses to institutional pressures is actors’ 
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ability to think and speak beyond prevailing institutional frames. While cognition 
comprises mental processes like perceiving, interpreting, and sensemaking, discourse 
refers to practices of talking and writing (e.g. Phillips et al., 2004; Cornelissen et al., 2015). 
The focus is on texts as well as on the context and the consequences of their production 
and diffusion (Schmidt, 2008). Accordingly, the discursive perspective conceptualizes 
institutions as a ‘textual affair’ (Munir & Phillips, 2005: p. 1669). From a cognitive point 
of view that builds on social constructivism (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), institutions are 
mental entities that exist only in the minds of the people (Holm, 1995). Institutions are 
constituted as meanings that are increasingly shared and accepted as reality (Hardy & 
Maguire, 2013; Phillips et al., 2004), a process that can be proactively supported and 
shaped by linguistic agents.  
Integrating institutional theory and cognition is a fascinating endeavor as 
‘institutional theory emphasizes similarities, but issue interpretations recognize 
differences’ (Bansal & Penner, 2002: p. 322). While institutionalism’s traditional focus on 
isomorphism seems to clash with the nature of cognitive processes that are first and 
foremost individual, they may also complement each other if we understand institutions as 
shared and taken-for-granted cognitive frames. Institutional influences and pressures are 
not free from filtering and interpretation processes (Wooten & Hoffman, 2013; Lawrence, 
1999). Individual actors have their personal selective attention and perception, cognitive 
frames and sense making (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Pache & Santos, 2010; Dorado, 2005). 
As cognition renders objective conditions differently (Dorado, 2005), the cognitive lens 
provides an explanation for heterogeneity in organizational knowledgeable responses to 
institutional pressures (Bansal & Penner, 2002; Wooten & Hoffman, 2013). Moreover, the 
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insight that individuals’ understandings, organizations’ actions and actors’ acceptance of 
institutions depends on cognitive processes, encourages some players to take proactive 
influence on institutional evolution by influencing others cognitions. Proactive agents may 
channel the sense-making activities of others (Garud et al., 2007) in directions of the 
institutional setups they favor. Shaping others’ understanding of institutional arrangements 
will mostly be realized via discursive activities (Phillips et al., 2004). 
 In this respect, discursive activities can take different forms and may be used for 
different developmental objectives. Concerning the latter, Mair et al. (2012: p. 827 & 840) 
point to the importance of ‘conscientization’, where others are provoked to self-reflect and 
question their institutional conditions to start de-naturalizing them and become aware of 
‘possibilities for expanding the boundaries of permissible behavior’. Another frequent 
objective is the active de-legitimatization of unfavorable institutions by describing existing 
structures or practices as unjust, ineffective or inefficient (Hardy & Maguire, 2013). In 
parallel, discourse is applied to promote alternative institutions (Phillips et al., 2004; Hardy 
& Maguire, 2013) and create legitimacy for institutional change and new practices (Seo & 
Creed, 2002; Hardy & Maguire, 2013).  
The most important objective attributed to discourse is the conviction and 
mobilization of potential followers (Battilana et al., 2009). As successful 
institutionalization requires a broad collective of supporters, discourse is the primary 
means for sharing ideas and understandings (Abdi & Aulakh, 2012; Moisander et al., 
2016), engaging in sense giving (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991), making change meaningful 
to others (Hardy & Maguire, 2013), building consensus (Hardy & Maguire, 2013), 
persuading potential collaborators (Garud et al., 2002), and generating collective action 
24 
 
(Benford & Snow, 2000). In order to achieve those objectives, actors may turn to different 
discursive tools and techniques.  
 
Self-regulation 
In case of institutional pressures being too intrusive (King & Lenox, 2000), too difficult 
(Okhmatovskiy & David, 2012) or overly costly (Lenox, 2006) to comply with, firms may 
decide to proactively install an alternative institutional arrangement for the same 
fundamental issue which is (planned to be) addressed by an undesirable government 
regulation (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011). This organizational knowledgeable response to 
unfavorable institutional pressures is called self-regulation and can be implemented by 
firms individually (Okhmatovskiy & David, 2012) or collectively through bodies such as 
trade associations (King & Lenox, 2000).  
Instead of complying at high costs or not complying at all (Okhmatovskiy & David, 
2012) organizations may allay the concerns of stakeholders (Lenox, 2006) by introducing 
alternative private institutions such as codes of business conduct, corporate governance 
codes, corporate social responsibility guidelines, or other prescriptions (Sethi, 2003; Bondy 
et al., 2004). Examples of self-regulation includes the voluntary adoption of environmental 
standards by the US chemical (King & Lenox, 2000; Lenox, 2006) and tourism (Rivera & 
de Leon, 2004) industries, introduction of individual internal corporate governance codes 
(ICGC) by Russian firms to avoid the demanding requirements of the official Russian 
corporate governance code (FCSM) (Okhmatovskiy and David, 2012), and the non-
obligatory adherence to IFRS standards (Alon, 2013). 
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By sticking to these self-imposed standards that are less costly to comply and more 
amenable to organizational influence (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011), organizations signal 
that they do not ignore important issues that are subject to regulation and avoid the negative 
consequences of noncompliance with the original institutional requirement (Okhmatovskiy 
& David, 2012). Proactively forestalling or replacing government regulation (Lenox, 2006) 
allows firms to justify their noncompliance with the original requirements (Okhmatovskiy 
& David, 2012) or to argue that those public institutions are not required anymore (Ahuja 
& Yayavaram, 2011).  
Critics of self-regulation point to the inherent danger of opportunism and free-
riding as the exerted institutional pressure is normative instead of coercive, and private 
standard-setters do not have the same power to monitor and sanction deviators as state 
authorities would have (King & Lenox, 2000). 
 
Strategies in the face of institutional voids 
In some environments–those where the institutional landscape is weakly developed–the 
primary institutional challenge for firms is not responding to pressures but filling or 
dodging institutional voids. They do so by applying two organizational strategies – 
substitution and internalization. While some of the strategies presented above, e.g. 
institutional entrepreneurship, may be equally applicable to institutionally deficient 





Substitution as a strategy to counter institutional voids rests on the assumption of different 
institutions being substitutable by one another. Transaction costs are frequently used as a 
selection criterion (Meyer, 2001). The constellation most frequently researched is the 
replacement of weak public formal institutions (e.g. contract enforcement and property 
rights protection) by private informal arrangements (e.g. networks) (Jackson & Deeg, 
2008; Batjargal et al., 2013) which is based on trust (Dyer & Chu, 2003), communal norms 
and intra-network sanctioning mechanisms (Greif, 2006; Hillmann & Aven, 2011). This 
informal system based on mutual support, effective monitoring, and fast transfer of reliable 
information allows for trustworthy partnerships (Hillmann, 2013) at rational transaction 
costs as uncertainty is reduced (Peng et al., 2009) by checking for partners’ social and 
reputational capital (Peng et al., 2005).   
A major limitation of private networks is that their effectiveness depends on density 
and closure (Abdi & Aulakh, 2012; Hillmann & Aven, 2011). As enforcement can only be 
ensured within the confines of close-knit communities they are primarily a local 
phenomenon that turns ineffective and inefficient when transactions cross spacial and 
social borders (Ingram & Silverman, 2000; Hillmann, 2013; Abdi & Aulakh, 2012). 
Another major limitation to reputation-based institutional arrangements is their 
dependence on recurring transactions (Zenger et al., 2002; Lazzarini et al., 2004). In 
addition, it can be noted that deficient formal institutions are not always replaced by 
informal ones in a socially favorable way; formal institutional voids may also lead to the 





Organizations that are either not able or not willing to rely on uncertain contractual 
arrangements (i.e. formal institutions) and do not have any faith in substitutes like relational 
norms or trust, may still decide for ownership control and internalize important operations 
(Feinberg & Gupta, 2009). Internalization theory (e.g. Buckley & Casson, 1976) suggests 
that internalizing is superior to market transactions as long as the transaction costs of 
trading internally are lower than those of using the market. In addition to transaction cost 
argument, internalization increases intra-firm specificity of a firm’s assets (reduces the risk 
of expropriation), reduces the cost of monitoring, and enhances the similarity of value 
systems and business practices (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009). As the dependence on local 
market participants, partners and institutions is greatly reduced (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009), 
organizations experience much less exposure to institutional voids (Chang & Hong, 2000; 
Guillén, 2000) and such negative consequences like information asymmetries between 
buyers and sellers (Meyer et al., 2009) or the risk of expropriation by cooperation partners 
(Feinberg & Gupta, 2009). By giving preference to make instead of buy, firms may increase 
the extent of intra-firm trade and revenue streams (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009). This claim is 
supported by numerous studies indicating that large diversified conglomerates situated in 
institutionally deficient emerging economies frequently enjoy higher profitability than 
independent firms (Chang & Hong, 2000; Guillén, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). 
 
Synthesis and extension of the extant literature  
Though being well-established, institutional theory still enjoys numerous developments 
and massive interest among scholars from different fields, including management, 
economics, sociology, politics and entrepreneurship. Decades of research by scholars from 
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all these fields have answered many questions and critiques, but also triggered new ones 
that have not yet been sufficiently answered by the academic community. In the context of 
our review presented in previous section, we synthesize some of these issues and 
simultaneously extend the literature by pointing to promising directions for future research. 
 
Institution and agency 
Although we outlined how the concept of embedded agency contributes to solving the 
structure-versus-agency debate, this long-standing struggle is not yet resolved. Very 
recently, international business research was criticized (e.g. Saka-Helmhout & Geppert, 
2011; Regnér & Edman, 2014) for its narrow view of institutions which largely accounts 
for their deterministic character as ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990: p. 3). Several scholars 
have lamented the strong underrepresentation of agency in institutional analyses of the 
multinational enterprise (MNE) (e.g. Kostova et al., 2008; Phillips et al., 2009). 
 On the contrary, studies that privilege agency are frequently criticized for 
promoting heroic models of actors (e.g. Garud et al., 2007). Particularly, ‘the notion of 
‘institutional entrepreneur’ too often invokes ‘hero’ imagery and deflects attention away 
from the wider array of actors and activities’ (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007: p. 993). 
Similarly, some institutionalists (e.g. Delmestri, 2006) criticize institutional 
entrepreneurship ‘for promoting an instrumental and disembedded view of agency that is, 
arguably, incompatible with institutional theory’ (Battilana et al., 2009: p. 73). We agree 
with others that future institutional research should investigate in how far a broader 
collective of actors contributes to institutional change (Hardy and Maguire, 2013; 
Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007). For instance, both the application of the discursive lens 
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(Zilber, 2007) and the integration of institutional theory and social movement theory (e.g. 
Lounsbury et al., 2003) hold great promise in this regard. 
 
Institution and isomorphism 
Institutional scholars have been criticized for quickly accepting isomorphism as a sufficient 
indicator of institutionalization (Heugens & Lander, 2009). Mizruchi and Fein (1999: p. 
664) complain that researchers are ‘positing a particular process that results in a behavioral 
outcome, but they are measuring only the outcome while assuming the process’. Others 
added that practices are not necessarily adopted for legitimacy reasons (Boxenbaum & 
Jonsson, 2013) or as a knowledgeable response to institutional pressures (Greenwood et 
al., 2013). There are multiple alternative explanations for isomorphism, including social-
level learning (Levitt & March, 1988), other ‘bandwagon’ processes (e.g. Abrahamson & 
Rosenkopf, 1993), or competitive superiority of the favored practice (Scott, 2008). Future 
empirical research is recommended to separate different kinds of isomorphism (Heugens 
& Lander, 2009) similar to Lee and Pennings (2002) and provide more compelling 
indicators of institutionalization than merely an increasing number of adopters 
(Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2013). 
 
Institution and its interdependency 
Institutional studies tend to focus on one single institution and neglect its mutual 
interdependencies with other institutions on the same or superordinate levels, a 
shortcoming that may be particularly inaccurate and misleading in studies of institutional 
entrepreneurship and change. While inter-institutional connectedness may increase the 
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constancy of an institution (Zucker, 1988) in times of stability, it may produce different 
patterns of dynamism in times of change (Holm, 1995). Notwithstanding rare exceptions 
(e.g. Crossland & Hambrick, 2011; Holm, 1995), institutional research has largely ignored 
such interdependencies. Scholars should take constellations of institutions into 
consideration instead of solely focusing on distinct ones. 
 
Institution and organization dynamics 
The majority of institutional studies decide for the environment, mostly the organizational 
field, as the level of analysis (Greenwood et al., 2013). While doing so organizations are 
treated as unitary actors and intra-organizational processes are ignored (Pache & Santos, 
2010; Greenwood et al., 2013). Institutional theory may be further developed by 
acknowledging that each organization consists of multiple pluralistic entities with 
individual perceptions, interests and power bases. As exemplified in the literature (e.g. Kim 
et al., 2007), investigating the interplay of institutional and intra-organizational dynamics 
seems promising. In particular, we agree with Pache and Santos (2010: p.459) who note 
that ‘intra-organizational processes are an important factor explaining differences in 
organizational knowledgeable responses to institutional pressures’. This interplay has 
implications on entrepreneurial activities such as setting up new firms and deciding on its 
business model, thereby helps in understanding why certain institutional environment give 
rise to more (or less) entrepreneurial activities (Dai and Liao, 2018; Opper et al., 2018). 
 
Institution and its maintenance 
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Hardy and Maguire (2013) raise the question whether organizational action ends once 
practices are initially institutionalized or it comprises subsequent ‘institutional work’ 
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) aiming at their continuous preservation (Hardy & Maguire, 
2013; Gill & Burrow, 2017). We conceive of institutional maintenance as being clearly 
distinct from mere stability or an absence of change, and involving directed activities by 
stakeholders interested in retaining a favorable institutional status quo (Adegbite & 
Nakajima, 2012). While some researchers point to the fact that institutions, even inefficient 
ones, may enjoy long-term persistence due to their long-established legitimacy, self-
reinforcing character, and organizational space in which they operate (Roberts & 
Greenwood, 1997; Siebert et al., 2017), literature hardly provides any accounts of active 
institutional maintenance (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lockett et al., 2009). Research 
tends to depict organizational knowledgeable responses to institutional pressures as a one-
time act. Future research may widen our horizon by conceptualizing organizational agency 
affecting institutions as an ongoing effort.  
 
Institution and its entrepreneurship 
Pointing to what we call institutional literature’s missing attention to the dark side, Mair 
and Martí (2009: p. 433) note that ‘an intriguing feature of the existing literature on 
institutional entrepreneurship is the almost complete lack of attention to its unintended and 
even negative effects’. Institutional literature provides numerous positive examples of 
institutional entrepreneurship and co-evolution in various fields like the health care system 
in Britain (Battilana et al., 2009), the telecommunications industry in Brazil (Rodrigues & 
Child, 2003), the chemical sector in China and Taiwan (Child & Tsai, 2005), and 
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diversified groups in South East Asia (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; Carney & Gedajlovic, 
2002), but has largely neglected opposition and failure. Although several researchers 
acknowledge the possibility of attacking or even eliminating institutions (e.g. Oliver, 1991; 
Kraatz & Block, 2013) it is always in the positive light of opposing inefficient or even evil 
institutional arrangements. Rare examples mention non-recoverable costs and 
disadvantageous lock-in effects (Cantwell et al., 2010) as well as piratical entrepreneurship 
(Puffer et al., 2010). Khan et al. (2007) offers the most extensive account of institutional 
entrepreneurship’s negative effects by elaborating on increased unemployment and poverty 
as a result of an institutional entrepreneurship initiative aimed at abolishing child labor in 
the Pakistani soccer ball stitching industry. We call for more critical perspectives on 
institutional entrepreneurship, both for the sake of scientific neutrality and the very 
promising insights covered behind the unsuccessful, unintended, and destructive instances 
of institutional entrepreneurship.   
While we do not limit this critique to institutional entrepreneurship but to 
institutional literature on organizational agency in general, we agree that there are way too 
few studies addressing destructive, unintended, or unsuccessful endeavors. Moreover, 
institutional literature has ignored consequences of organizational actions or institutional 
change that were unintended such as unrecognized inter-institutional cause-effect chains 
(Garud et al., 2007; Kraatz & Block, 2013) and organizational vitality (Oertel et al., 2016). 
Equally absent from the literature, but highly promising in terms of potential learnings, are 
instances of failed organizational agency (Hardy & Maguire, 2013; Battilana, 2006). Garud 
et al. (2007) and Hardy and Maguire (2013) argue that the limited attendance to the dark 
side stems from institutionalists’ tendency to depict organizational actors, particularly 
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institutional entrepreneurs, as heroic leaders, as it runs the risk of emphasizing 
intentionality and success. Another underrepresented perspective that links the dark side of 
institutional change and the aforementioned institutional maintenance is opposition or 
resistance to institutional change (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2012; Hardy & Maguire, 2013). 
 
Institution and its change process 
We see most promise for future institutional research in the expansion of cognitive and 
discursive studies and the execution of process-focused empirical research. Cognitive and 
discursive strategies, both as part of an institutional entrepreneur’s repertoire and as a 
separate proactive approach, are powerful tools for modifying institutional arrangements. 
The discipline is still rather nascent and offers numerous white spots researchers could 
make the subject of their efforts. Weber and Glynn (2006) call for more exploration of 
sense making in the context of institutionalization. Zilber (2007: p. 1050) also notes that 
‘there are not many studies that explore how meanings are constructed and manipulated’, 
Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) being a rare exception. Concerning discourse, Zilber 
(2007) contends that we do not know how exactly discursive mechanism are used by actors 
in the field. Future research may benefit from a detailed investigation of the content of 
texts, their effects, and different discursive mediums. Empirical progress in the cognitive 
and the discursive realm can be generated by collecting data ‘in situ and in vivo’ (Zilber, 
2007: p. 1051). Similar to Zilber (2007) and Phillips et al. (2004), ethnographic studies can 
be conducted to deep-dive into the use of sense making and discourse in the context of 
organizational attempts to shape institutional arrangements. With regard to other future 
research potentials mentioned above, cognitive and discursive studies are of particular 
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interest. As the dissemination of both texts and meanings is a clearly collective process, 
cognitive and discursive studies may lead research on institutional entrepreneurship away 
from its hero imagery and enhance the emphasis on broader collectives’ impact on 
institutionalization (Zilber, 2007). Furthermore, discourse and sense making, seen as 
ongoing processes, may grow our knowledge on institutional maintenance, but also on 
intra-organizational dynamics and the dark side. 
 Concerning process studies, we join other scholars’ (e.g. Phillips et al., 2004) call 
for more such research in the field of organizational institutionalism. Dorado (2005) points 
to the need to understand how (as opposed to why) institutional change is created. Hardy 
and Maguire (2013) draw a dividing line between actor-centric perspectives and process-
centric perspectives. The latter, that have been applied all too rarely, hold great promise 
for understanding how exactly organizations can impact institutional change, and, 
additionally, allow for zooming into unintended and negative results of such processes 
(Hardy and Maguire, 2013). Concerning institutional entrepreneurship, Phillips et al. 
(2004: p. 648) lament that ‘existing views of institutional entrepreneurship leave its exact 
nature and the mechanisms through which institutional entrepreneurs work undefined’. 
Hardy and Maguire (2013: p. 199) agree by stating that it is ‘unclear how institutional 
entrepreneurs get other embedded field members to take up and institutionalize new 
practices’. These kinds of questions, that are left unanswered by institutional literature so 
far, are exactly where process-focused studies can create considerable impact. A more 
process-focused view on how organizations respond to or impact institutional contexts 
incorporates the potential to simultaneously address some of the above-mentioned 
shortcomings within institutional literature. By investigating processes of institutional 
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change, scholars cannot merely measure the outcome while assuming the process, would 
probably not treat organizations as unitary actors, and may shed light on under-researched 
phenomena like institutional maintenance. Moreover, it seems that ‘disadvantages and 
possible negative outcomes of institutional entrepreneurship are more likely to be 
recognized in process-centric narratives’ (Hardy & Maguire, 2013: p. 212). 
 
Institution and its integration with other theories 
 Although institutional theory has been applied to many management phenomena 
like mergers (Joshi et al., 2010), diversification (Peng et al., 2005), or strategic alliances 
(Dacin et al., 2007), it has only limitedly been integrated with other theories from 
management and related fields. For instance, we share Greenwood et al.’s (2013) 
assessment that the juxtaposition of institutional theory and the dynamic capabilities view 
would be an innovative and promising lens, particularly in emerging markets’ fast-paced 
institutional environments. Integrative studies may produce great impetus for academic 
research as it lies not in the tradition of institutionalism to explain phenomena like change 
and dynamism (Child & Tsai, 2005). Dialogue with more activity-centered perspectives 
like dynamic capabilities, agency theory, or micro politics is assumed to produce fruitful 
contradictions and novel academic insights. Particularly, for researching organizational 
impact on institutional change the institutional literature hides great potential of arriving at 
new understanding when it leverages synergies with other research traditions (Davis & 
Marquis, 2005; Battilana et al., 2009). In this regard, Child and Tsai (2005) particularly 
promote further integration of institutional and political perspectives for developing 
knowledge concerning embedded agency and co-evolutionary approaches like institutional 
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entrepreneurship. Agreement comes from Holburn and Vanden Bergh (2002) who state 
that compared to the massive literature on competitive strategies, non-market strategies 
have received little academic attention. Future research integrating institutional and 
political accounts may, for instance, expand non-market strategies beyond political 
scholars’ focus on government officials and draw scholarly attention to other relevant 
institutions (e.g. financial institutions, labor forces) (Peng et al., 2005). 
 
Conclusion 
We started this research with an objective to understand the opportunities organizations 
have at hand to beneficially position themselves in the face of institutional pressures and 
strategically cope with them. For answering the first research question, we identified three 
broad thematic areas (i.e. passively responding within one organizational field, reactively 
responding to institutional multiplicity, and proactive developing institutional 
environments through embedded agents) and explained how organizations deal with 
different institutional pressures within each of those themes. In the process, we captured 
how the knowledgeable responses of organizations to institutional pressures have changed 
overtime, thereby answered the second research question. In the synthesis and extension 
section, we identified research gaps and formulated research questions that offer promising 
avenues for future work. Based on the review conducted, we conclude that, despite its age 
and maturity, institutional theory still enjoys massive interest in the academic world 
exemplified by several debates (e.g. Greenwood et al., 2014; Meyer & Höllerer, 2014) and 
continues to hold promising roads for future research to enrich our understanding of how 





During the era of new institutionalism, the institutional environment has been largely 
conceptualized as a unitary and stable organizational field and focused on organizational 
acquiescence leading to structural and behavioral isomorphism. Later, this core view of 
new institutionalism is complemented by the recognition of conflicting institutional 
demands and the concept of institutional multiplicity that allows organizations to exercise 
some level of strategic choice. We discussed organizational knowledgeable responses that 
conceive of the institutional environment as largely externally given and aim at 
circumventing institutional pressures. Triggered by the structure-versus-agency debate, 
institutional literature has further developed by addressing the paradox of embedded 
agency and creating more and more contributions that assigned organizations an even more 
active role in responding to and developing institutional arrangements.  
Accordingly, this paper elaborates on proactive organizational approaches that span from 
institutional entrepreneurship over political strategies to cognitive and discursive 
approaches influencing institutional setups. These knowledgeable responses account for 
institutionalists’ recent interest in explaining structural and behavioral heterogeneity 
instead of isomorphism, self-interested agency instead of obedience, and change rather than 
stability (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2013; Wooten & Hoffman, 2013). Simultaneously, the 
institutional literature has emancipated from its initial US ethno-centrism (Greenwood et 
al., 2013) and meanwhile incorporates numerous accounts addressing different 
institutional environments including emerging and transition markets where the key 
institutional challenge for organizations is not dodging institutional pressures but 
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proactively filling the institutional voids. We expect the comprehensive synthesis 
conducted in this research to lay the framework for investigating how knowledge-based 
view of the organization influences its knowledgeable response to institutional pressure. 
 
Practice implications 
After years of intensive development, today’s institutional literature offers a rich portfolio 
of organizational knowledgeable responses to institutional pressures. The variety of 
approaches supports managers in both developed and emerging markets in reacting 
appropriately to the different institutional environments–either passively, actively, or 
proactively. Although introduced separately for structural and educational reasons, 
knowledgeable response strategies are not mutually exclusive (Cantwell et al., 2010; 
Khanna et al., 2010) and need not be applied on a stand-alone basis. On the contrary, as 
institutional environments and their impact on organizations vary widely across–and even 
within–organizational fields (Henisz & Delios, 2002; Clemens & Douglas, 2005; Khanna 
et al., 2005), the potential responses may be fruitfully combined (Okhmatovskiy & David, 
2012; Cantwell et al., 2010; Oliver, 1991). A single organization’s knowledgeable 
responses may vary across different host countries and industrial sectors (Cantwell et al., 
2010). Moreover, as institutional arrangements develop over time, organizational 
knowledgeable responses need to change as well (Khanna et al., 2010; Cantwell et al., 
2010). Instead of a one-size-fits-all strategy (Wan, 2005), managers should carefully 
analyze the institutional environment (Khanna et al., 2005) and customize their 
organization’s array of knowledgeable responses by always taking firm-specific resources 





Whenever possible, we outlined the enabling conditions or limitations to the applicability 
of the discussed approaches. These are of particular relevance for institutional actors that 
want to engage in institutional change but also for policy makers that want to support or 
hinder specific institutional developments. Institutional reforms and conditions may have 
substantial impact on the economic development of countries or industries (Dikova & van 
Witteloosstujin, 2007). Whether introduced coercively by the state or co-evolutionarily 
developed by private stakeholders, institutional developments like the enhanced provision 
of public goods, the containment of corruption, or the improvement of market 
intermediation have significant impact on whether a country attracts firms and prospers 
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Figure 2: Simplified illustration of institutional concepts and organizational 
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Other terms Activities Reasoning / benefit Examples from literature 
Ceremonial 
adoption 
 symbolic adoption 
(Kostova & Roth, 
2002) 
 decoupling 
(e.g. Okhmatovskiy & 
David, 2012) 
 surface isomorphism 
(Greenwood et al., 
2013) 
 meet some demands by 
action, and others ‘by 
talk’ (Boxenbaum & 
Jonsson, 2013) 
 claim to comply with a 
practice while in reality 
not implementing it 
(Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 
2013) 
 decoupling appearance 
from the technical core 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 
2013; Greenwood et al., 
2013) 
 simultaneously achieve 
legitimacy and secure 
efficiency and 
profitability (Deephouse 
& Suchman, 2013; 
Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 
2013). 
 solve identity conflicts 
by presenting themselves 
differently to different 
stakeholders 
(Kraatz & Block, 2013; 
Zajac & Westphal, 2004) 
 decoupling in the 
adoption of stock 
repurchase programs 
(Westphal & Zajac, 
2004) 
 ceremonial adoption of a 
shareholder value 
orientation (Fiss & 
Zajac, 2004) 
Avoidance  circumvention 
(Regnér & Edman, 
2014) 
 jurisdiction shopping / 
jurisdictional arbitrage 
(Ahuja & Yayavaram, 
2011) 
 exiting the affected 
geographical location 
(Ahuja & Yayavatam, 
2011; Child & Tsai, 
2005) 
 exiting the affected 
industry (Oliver, 1991) 
 exit the domain in which 
the institutional pressure 
is exerted (Pache & 
Santos, 2010; Oliver, 
1991; Kraatz & Block, 
2013) 




 firms positioning 
themselves in the 
assurance industry in 
order to avoid 
institutional pressures 
specifically designed for 
banks 




Compromise -  initiate negotiations with 
multiple institutional 
entities (Pache & Santos, 
2010; Oliver, 1991) 
 balance all competing 
expectations (Pache & 
Santos, 2010) 




 achieve parity between 
all relevant stakeholders 
as well as internal 
interests 
(Oliver, 1991) 
 solve institutional 
tensions by cooperative 
approach 
(Kraatz & Block, 2013) 
 organizing a consulting 
firm into two distinct 




(Pache & Santos, 2013) 
Ignorance -  organizations might 
actively decide to ignore 
institutional pressures 
within a weak 
institutional environment 
(Cantwell et al., 2010) 
 explicit rejection of an 
institutional demand 
(Pache & Santos, 2010) 
when the organization 
disagrees with the 
objectives of the 
institution that exerts the 
pressure (Boxenbaum & 
Jonsson, 2013) 
 when the likelihood of 
‘getting caught’ is low 
(Oliver, 1991) due to 
political instability, poor 
regulation, deficient 
enforcement, and lack of 
accountability 
 when organization is 
faced with 
extraordinarily beneficial 
role expectations  
 when the dependence on 
that institution’s approval 
and support is low 
(Oliver, 1991) 
 foreign banks in Japan 
were much less than 
local banks faced with 
the expectation to stick 
to traditionally 
legitimated practices. 
Hence, not being at the 
center of institutional 
interest and monitoring, 
they were able to ignore 
existing institutional 
pressures without 
incurring any negative 











High degree of 
institutional 
heterogeneity 
The more contradictions institutional entrepreneurs encounter, 
the more change they envision (Seo & Creed, 2002; 
Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006)  
Low degree of 
institutionalization 
 
Established norms and practices are either absent (Maguire et 
al., 2004) or have not yet gained deep-rooted and stable 
legitimacy (Henisz & Zelner, 2005) 
Disruptions 
 
Social upheaval, new technologies, economic crisis, or 
regulatory changes (Battilana et al., 2009; Hardy & Maguire, 
2013) end ‘what has become locked in by institutional inertia’ 
(Hoffman, 1999: p. 353) 
 
 
Table 4: Personal or organizational characteristics enabling institutional entrepreneurship 
Characteristic Explanation 
Peripheral 
position in the 
organizational 
field 
 less awareness of and less embeddedness in institutional norms 
and practices (Battilana, 2006; Hardy & Maguire, 2013) 
 higher likelihood of being exposed to alternative institutional 
arrangements (Hardy & Maguire, 2013) 
 less privileges given by prevailing institutions (Battilana, 2006) 
 higher encouragement regarding institutional modifications 
(Lawrence, 1999) 
 lack of power and resources to implement institutional change 
(Garud et al., 2007) 
Central 




 sufficient resources and power to innovate (Garud et al., 2007; 
Battilana, 2006) 
 missing incentives to engage in change (Garud et al., 2007; 
Battilana, 2006) 
 tendency to benefit from the current institutional setup (Hardy & 
Maguire, 2013) 
Others  Reflexivity (Beckert, 1999; Seo & Creed, 2002) 
 Superior political and social skills (Hardy & Maguire, 2013) 
 Immigrant background (Kraatz & Moore, 2002) 
 Reputation, social status and legitimacy (Battilana, 2006) 
 Experience with previous institutional entrepreneurship 














 disembed from the existing institutional framework (Beckert, 
1999) 
 actively reflect on and challenge existing rules and practices 
(Pacheco et al., 2010) 
 envisioning alternative institutional arrangements (Emirbayer 




 mobilize material / financial resources (Lawrence & Suddaby, 
2006; Battilana et al., 2009) 
 acquire intangible resources like information and know-how 
(Dorado, 2005; Hardy & Maguire, 2013) 
 build on social resources like positional, political, or 
reputational assets (Battilana et al., 2009; Mair & Martí, 2009) 
 use networks to enhance access to diverse tangible and 




 offer incentives to potential allies (Pacheco et al., 2010)  
 apply sanctions to silence potential opponents (Hardy & 
Maguire, 2013) 
 initiate partnerships to enhance the available resource base 
(Stam & Elfring, 2008)  
 build trust to lessen the risk of being considered illegitimate or 
being opposed (Greenwood et al., 2002) 
Discoursing 
 
 use of symbolic language, storytelling, analogies, and framing 
(Zilber, 2007; Lounsbury et al., 2003; Benford & Snow, 2000) 
 explain causes, assign blame, and provide solutions (Garud et 
al., 2007) 
 depict preferred institutional change as appealing to others 
 discredit existing institutional arrangements (Henisz & Zelner, 
2005) 
 
 
